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Abstract 
Do government policies increase the likelihood that some citizens will become 
persistent criminals? What is the role of other organisations and institutions in 
mediating offending over the life-course? Using concepts derived from criminology 
(such as the idea of a ‘criminal career’, an individual’s repeated, longitudinal sequence 
of offending), and concepts such as the life-course from sociology, this paper assesses 
the outcome of macro-level economic policies on individuals’ engagement in crime 
from age 10 to 30. Whilst many studies have explored the impact of 1980s ‘New Right’ 
governments on welfare spending, housing and the economy, few studies in political 
science, sociology or criminology have directly linked macro-economic policies to 
individual offending careers. Employing individual-level longitudinal data, we track a 
sample of Britons born in 1970 from childhood to adulthood, examining their offending 
trajectories between ages 10 and 30, and hence through a period of dramatic 
economic and social change in the UK throughout the early-1980s, during which the 
economy was dramatically restructured. As such, we are primarily concerned with the 
effects of economic policies on an individual’s repeated offending. Using data from the 
British 1970 Birth Cohort Study, we develop a model that incorporates individuals, 
families and schools, and which takes account of national-level economic policies 
(which were driven by New Right political ideas) and which, we argue, shaped 
individual offending careers. Our paper suggests that processes of economic 
restructuring were a key causal factor in offending during this period. This broader 
framework also emphasises the importance of considering political and economic 
forces in criminal careers and related research. The paper therefore encourages 
criminologists to draw upon ideas from political science when developing explanations 
of offending careers, and shows how the choices over the political management of the 
economy encourage individual-level responses.   
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Research into criminal careers is a mainstay of criminological, sociological and psychological 
endeavours. Early research into why people started offendingi  has developed into research 
on why offenders continue to offendii and, more recently, why they desist from offending.iii 
Criminologists have identified an increase in levels of offending during the teenage years, 
‘peaking’ in the late-teens and early- to mid-20s, followed by a slow ‘decay’ in engagement in 
crime. Generally speaking, those who start to offend earliest and most frequently, tend to be 
engaged in offending for longer periods, in some cases decades. Research into criminal 
careers has tended to be dominated by quantitative researchers, although the literature is 
replete with many examples of qualitative research, and of late qualitative research into 
offending trajectories has seen a resurgence. Numerous theories, drawing upon thinking 
derived from sociology,iv psychology,v or psychiatryvi  have been developed since the early-
20th Century. Research into criminal careers has made considerable contributions to public 
policies in both North America and Europe.vii  
 
Outlining the Life-Course Perspective 
As many have come to recognize,viii the life-course perspective has had a dramatic impact 
upon thinking within criminology, especially so since the early-1990s. Indeed, a very large 
part of contemporary criminology’s theoretical apparatus is derived from the work of life-
course scholars.ix One of the key aims of the life-course perspective is to draw links between 
macro-level social history and social structures, and the lives of individuals and communities. 
The life-course perspective aims to explore “pathways through the age differentiated life-
span”, and is “manifested in expectations and options that impinge on decision processes 
and the course of events that give shape to life stages, transitions and turning points”x. Two 
concepts central to this perspective are the notions of ‘trajectory’ and ‘transitions’. The first 
refers to a line of development over the life-course (e.g. an employment career), and the 
second refers to events (e.g. first job, promotion etc.) which shape a trajectory. Sampson and 
Laubxi describe the perspective as focusing upon “...the duration, timing and ordering of 
major social events and their consequences for later social development”. As Elder et al note, 
rapid social change has the ability to re-arrange the timing and sequence of events in the 
transition to adulthood.xii  
Elder and Gielexiii also note the importance of locating people (either particular individuals, 
subgroups or cohorts of people) in specific communities and at specific historical moments. 
Such thinking forces one to recognize that individuals do not exist in isolation; they are 
embedded in wider social, economic and political contexts and relationships. Similarly, 
individuals are key constitutive parts of what is termed the ‘family-cycle’, whereby people 
move from being children, to leaving the parental home, forming partnerships, rearing their 
own children and survival into old age. As these are not strictly age-defined, the typicality of 
any form of such cycle has waxed and waned (as age of marriage, age at first childbirth and 
rates of step-families have fluctuated). As individuals exert agency, the combination of 
people and wider social structures brings forth the possibility of what Elder and Gielexiv refer 
to as a ‘loose-coupling’ between age-graded life-courses and individual choice. Norms exist, 
but individuals are able to depart from them or to adapt them to suit their own 
circumstances. This highlights the extent to which variations in the timing and sequence of 
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life-course events may produce substantive differences in outcomes (or be the result of other 
differences).  
The focus on wider social and economic structures in the work of Elder and others
xviii
xv 
highlights the ways in which individuals’ lives are linked to one another. As such, events and 
long-term trajectories in the lives of parents in a family may alter the life-courses of their 
offspring. As the individuals which make up families age, so they form an aging social 
network, referred to as a ‘social convey’xvi; a group of inter-connected people who move 
through time together. As Moen and Hernandezxvii note, an individual’s resources, deficits in 
these, strains upon them, increases in them and so on, become not just drivers of transitions 
or turning points in the lives of the individuals themselves, but also in the lives those people 
who are in some way related to them (either socially or biologically). For example, the loss of 
work for a parent on whom a family had relied, affects not just the individual concerned, but 
their dependents. As Elder remarks, “each generation is bound to fateful decisions and 
events in the other’s life-course”.  Similarly, the individual’s social network may be 
affected by the individual’s loss of work, or divorce. As such, the concept of a ‘social convey’ 
can be extended away from family members; school mates, co-workers, acquaintances, 
loosely-engaged strangers and so on are potential members of such conveys. Similarly, a lot 
of attention has been devoted to the idea of timings and to different types of ‘time’. Alwinxix 
distinguishes between historical time (essentially the historical era in which one lives) and 
biographical time (the life-course of the individual concerned) and shows how they may 
interact. Meanwhile, Elderxx introduces the concept of social timing (the duration, incidence 
and sequence of age-related expectations and beliefs). 
 
Critiquing Life-Course Criminology 
One of the debates which haunts life-course studies is the need for answers to pressing social 
challenges now. This is not always possible. Implicit in this critique is the idea that the social 
and cultural processes, economic forces and political ideas which shape the experiences of 
one generation may not be the same as those which will affect future generations. In short, 
societies change, and as they change so different drivers to such changes may come to have 
different impacts over time. Some cultural forces may die out and cease to have any 
purchase on individuals’ life-courses, others may grow in importance. Such thinking, of 
course, recognizes the problem of age, period and cohort effects.
xxiii
xxi The institutions which 
shape lives may change or cease to exist; but yet few criminologists have recognized that the 
changes in such institutions have been dramatic in some societies. Benson, argues that those 
“working in the life-course tradition have not yet devoted as much effort to understanding 
the contextual effects on trajectories in crime as they have to studying the parameters of 
careers at the individual-level”.xxii Since Benson’s critique, others  have started to explore 
the role of neighbourhood factors, however even this misses the macro-level processes 
Benson’s critique identifies. Similarly, educational sociologist Gleesonxxiv argued that 
behavioralist explanations which focus on individual psychologies and family characteristics 
pathologize, aiding the creation of stereotypes whilst simultaneously overlooking the macro-
level political, social and economic processes at play. This critique suggests that additional 




A further limitation of criminal careers research is that, for many very good reasons, studies 
are often based in one location. For example, the Cambridge Study in Delinquency 
Development, The Pittsburgh Youth Study, the Rochester Youth Study, The Edinburgh Study 
of Youth Transitions, and the Peterborough Adolescent Development Study were based on 
data from respondents recruited from one place (be that a whole city or a part or parts of a 
city). Whilst in some cases such cities are large and heterogeneous, such designs do not allow 
for changes which affect different parts of the same country in different ways. Even if the 
locations in which the data were collected are not mono-cultural at the local-level, they are 
spatially-invariant at the macro-level; hence the impacts of social and economic changes 
which do not fall evenly within a country are not available for analysis. One of our aims then, 
is to explore the impact of changing social and economic processes on the offending careers 
of one generation of UK citizens in such a way as to incorporate macro-level variables which 
may be causal antecedents of offending, and which, in so doing, avoids some of the pitfalls of 
behavioralist explanations.  
 
In addition to this, and despite the undoubted quality of much of the research into criminal 
careers, it remains the case that much of the quantitative research has tended to tackle the 
causal processes of offending in a largely individualized manner. This ranges from a near-
total emphasis on individual-level processes,
xxvii xxviii
xxv to individual-institutional interactionsxxvi  
although more ecological models do exist.  This observation led Sampson  to note that 
society and the idea of social change was one of the key elements which was missing from 
current research on criminal careers. Similar observations about life-course research have 
been made by those working outside of criminology. For example, Mayer noted that the 
“unravelling of the impacts of institutional contexts and social processes … on life-courses 
has hardly begun”, adding that 
“we know next to nothing about how the internal dynamics of life-courses and the 
interaction of developmental and social components of the life-course vary and how 
they are shaped by the macro contexts of institutions and social policies.”xxix  
Thus, whilst life-course criminology has meticulously focused on proximal institutions 
(families, schools, employers and communities), those institutional arrangements and the 
discourses and policies which surround and flow from more distal institutionsxxx (political 
parties, governance structures) and the ideas they promulgate (discourses about ‘the family’, 
ideological stances on education, economic policies and so on) have not received very much 
attention at all. In short, the current approaches adopted by life-course criminologists tend 
to encourage the construction of ‘the offender’ in individualistic terms. It is an offender’s 
decision-making, marriages (or lack thereof), skills and employment chances which are often 
found to account for their onset, maintenance and desistance.xxxi  This body of scholarship, 
as technically sophisticated as it is, has failed to engage with literatures which suggest that 
political decision making (such as economic or welfare policies) shapes the lives and life-
courses of citizens. This lacuna in criminological research means that the field reproduces 
constructions and discourses relating to offenders which are inherently pathologizing and 
which fail to consider the ways in which macro-level political and economic processes and 
policies may shape individual life-courses and their engagement in crime. The wider political, 
economic and social processes which are implicated in the onset of offender careers and 
which sustain involvement in crime are therefore routinely excluded from criminological 
theorising. Herein we seek to encourage the consideration of the more ‘distal’ influences on 
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criminal careers, such as national-level social and political changes, and the economic and 
social policies which shape (and are shaped by) these. We aim to explore the impact of 
economic change (and the political ideologies which preceded these transformations and the 
social consequences which followed them) on offending trajectories using data from the 
UK.xxxii 
 







 is one author who has attempted to theorize how social and economic change 
may alter environments in ways which might affect engagement in crime over the life-
course. He notes that very few criminologists have explored the ways in which the State (and 
hence changes in those things which the State can influence, such as taxation or welfare 
policies) can shape criminal careers.  Benson argues that as well as decisions over which 
behaviors are criminalized, States can shape offending careers via their policies relating to 
transportation systems, housing policies and economic decisions.xxxv In exploring the 
concentration of poverty amongst the US’s Black population, Benson draws on Wilson’s 
work  to show how decisions made by politicians, State officials and private individuals 
have helped to leave the US’s Black population living with higher levels of family disruption 
and residential instability than is the norm in the US.  These processes took several 
decades to emerge and were underscored by changes in the economy, which saw a long 
period of economic slowdown after 1974, during which many manufacturing jobs were 
lost.  Such jobs were key to ensuring informal social control amongst lower class males, 
since they offered a chance for relatively highly-paid employment without the need for high 
levels of education. As jobs started to be shed, so inner city areas started to spiral into decay, 
and crime and the fear of crime began to rise.  Benson theorizes that such changes would 
have affected the lives of those young men (especially) and women who lived in such 
communities.  
Another criminologist who has theorized the ways in which criminal careers may be shaped 
by wider social and economic factors is Hagan. Haganxl develops a theory of crime and 
capitalisation based on a detailed review of the changes in the US economy since the end of 
WWII. He notes, like Benson, how economic restructuring, rises in economic inequality, 
residential segregation and the concentration of poverty have left some US inner cities with 
few meaningful employment careers on which to build law-abiding life-styles. Some 
communities have, instead of legitimate incomes, started to rely on deviant activities (drug 
sales, prostitution and other illegal services) as a means for securing an income. Such 
activities become entrenched as, over time, few people have links to legitimate employers 
and crime becomes embedded in communities’ daily routines. Such activities therefore also 
start to shape the lives of the men and women who live in these communities.  
Nevertheless, there are no other studies which we can find which take seriously the idea that 
political decision-making (around the management of the economy, the allocation of 
resources, and the extent of, for example, levels of economic inequality which are tolerated), 
may in some way provoke or be associated with offending behaviors at the individual-level. 
Accordingly, our aim is to incorporate an understanding of the role of political processes into 
the statistical modelling of individual criminal careers, such that current criminological 
debates about criminal careers pay greater attention to the role of politics (especially with 
regards to the management of the economy) in the evolution of such careers. In this way, 
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our research adds to the literature on the penal-welfare nexus, in that we explore the ways 
in which changes in the social and economic policies pursued by the Thatcher-led 
governments led to increases in crime, which in turn led to ‘toughened’ criminal justice 
policies under Prime Minister Tony Blair.xli  We approach the social and economic changes 
brought about or augmented by the Thatcher and Major governments from 1979-1997 as 
being distal events, which radically altered the social and economic circumstances for many 
UK citizens (such as regionally-varying unemployment). These distal events, in turn shaped 
proximal events and processes which led to some individuals becoming involved in crime. 
  
An Outline of the Remainder of this Contribution 
The rest of our paper unfolds along the following lines. In the next section we review what is 
known about the relationship between the economy and crime rates, focusing on the UK 
experience. This also serves as an overview of the economic history of the UK in the 1970s.  
We then outline the data upon which we rely, and our analytic strategy. Following this we 
present two near-identical path diagrams (one which does not include a measure of 
economic change at the county-level, and one which does). Finding that economic 
restructuring does help to explain offending careers, we then control for the extent of 
economic restructuring at the county-level to assess the geographical impact of economic 
restructuring on offending careers. We then reflect on the findings we have produced and 
locate these within wider literatures on both offending careers and economic, social and 
political change.    
 
 
The UK in the 1970s, the 1980s New Right and the Radical Reshaping of 
Society 
There is an extensive and longstanding literature on the relationship between economic 
conditions and crime, focusing in particular on effects of the business cycle and 
unemployment rates.
xliii
xlii Most studies test the economy-crime link in the context of evidence 
from the US or the UK.  Economic hardship interacts with effects of other social and 
criminal justice policies. For example, Hale and Sabbaghxliv find that the effect of increases in 
police manpower in Britain during the 1980s was nullified by the sizeable increases in 
unemployment experienced at that same time.  
The literature suggests that lagging and coincident indicators of economic conditions, such as 
the unemployment rate, income inequality, GDP, and consumer sentiment, contribute to 
increased rates of property crime either through production of need and hence criminal 
motivation, or through the relative availability of ‘steal-able’ goods and commodities.xlv It is, 
however, rare for analyzes of the economy-crime link to be embedded in theories about 
wider social, economic and political changes. That is to say that the existing studies are 
conceived as a test of the effect of economic variables on rates of crime, rather than 
reflecting upon either the historical backdrop to changes in the crime rate, or the theoretical 
foundations of the economy-crime link.  
Let us now turn to a consideration of the UK’s economic fortunes between the 1970s and the 
1990s. Throughout much of the 1970s, the UK faced considerable economic difficulties. The 
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inflation rate, which started at around 7% in 1972, reached 24% in 1975,
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi and stood at over 
13% in 1979. Unemployment rates fared little better (despite a drop in 1973-74 to 3%), and 
stabilized around 5% for the period from 1976 to 1979.  The breakdown of the relationship 
between unemployment and inflation led British governments to retreat from Keynesian 
fiscal policies and focus, to varying degrees, upon monetarist policies and the welfare 
retrenchment associated with these.  In addition, the UK borrowed $3.9Bn from the IMF 
in 1976, resulting in cuts in education budgets.xlix Declining real wages from 1975 to 1978 
and widespread strikes culminated in the so-called ‘Winter of Discontent’ in 1978-79.l 
In May 1979, the UK elected its first ‘radical right’ government. Space precludes a full 
discussion of the impact of the Thatcher governments’ policies on UK society,li but it is 
important to highlight some of the early economic policies associated with this government. 
One of the first things which the government did was to increase interest rates. However, 
this had the unintended consequence of immediately weakening the UK’s manufacturing 
sector,lii producing a sharp fall in manufacturing output between 1979 and 1981liii; indeed, 
the economy experienced negative growth for much of the early-1980s.liv As the early 
Thatcher governments focused on reducing inflation over the goal of full employment, 
unemployment increased in the 1980s (Figure 1). So damaging were their policies that the 
Conservatives abandoned their monetarist ideals (their monetarist phase ran between 1981 
and 1984). However, the UK economy’s troubles persisted for many years with widespread 
economic disruption and unemployment. During the mid-1980s there was a year-long 
miners’ strike, which the National Union of Mineworkers lost, resulting in the closure of 
many mines and the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. The abandonment of monetarism was 
followed by a focus on privatisation and financial deregulation (1983-1986), which 
contributed to the so-called ‘Lawson Boom’ of 1986-88. The economic and social turbulence, 
however, was not evenly distributed across the UK. The communities most heavily impacted 
upon were those most reliant upon heavy industry and manufacturing, and which were 
located in the Midlands and the North of England, South Wales, and central Scotland (all 
places once associated with mining and/or steel production and manufacturing). Accordingly, 
the unemployment rate rose dramatically, reaching almost 12% by the mid-1980s, from 
around 2% in the mid-1970s. From the mid-1980s, inflation also rose, and successive budgets 
reduced personal taxation. The economic restructuring, almost always associated with 
processes of deindustrialisation (which had started in the late-1960s, Tomlinson, 1990) was 




Figure 1. National Unemployment Rate (percent), 1970-2006
 
The liberalisation of the UK’s financial markets and changes to the tax regime from the 1980s 
contributed to rising inequality (Figure 2) as the Thatcher government abolished higher rates 
of taxation and increased indirect taxation, which had a greater marginal effect on the less 
well-off. 
 
Figure 2. Income Inequality (Gini coefficient, after housing costs), 1970-2006 
 
These trends in the post-war British economy correspond to long-term patterns of change in 
the rate of property crime (Figure 3, which is compiled from the Home Office’s recorded 
statistics for England and Wales, 1961-2006). The steepest rises in the rate of property crime 
occurred during the 1980s and early-1990s, also coinciding with sharp increases in levels of 
unemployment and inequality. This is consistent with the findings generated by statistical 



































Figure 3. Property Crime Per Capita (Home Office Recorded Statistics, England & Wales and 
the British Crime Survey) 
 
Statistical modellinglvii suggests that the economic policies initiated by the Thatcher 
governments forced several state-owned industrial companies (such as British Steel, British 
Coal and car manufacturers, some of which were state-owned) to make employees 
redundant. The eventual loss by the National Union of Miners of the year-long miners’ strike 
resulted in substantial job losses in mining. As these job losses cascaded through the 
economy, so jobs in sectors which were dependent on mining (such as railways and 
engineering) were also lost. In short, the economic restructuring which had started in the 
1960s reached a zenith during the 1980s. From the mid to late-1980s the UK started the 
transition to a post-industrial nation. The official document Social Trends for 2007 reports 
that: 
“Over the last 25 years the UK economy has experienced structural change. […] the 
extraction and production industries, made up of agriculture and fishing, energy and 
water, manufacturing, and construction showed a combined fall of 43% from 8.2m 
jobs in 1981 to 4.7m jobs in 2006. Manufacturing alone accounted for 81% of this 
decline, with the number of employee jobs in this sector nearly halving from 5.9m in 
1981 to 3m in 2006.”lviii 
As modellinglix has shown, the resulting increase in unemployment was associated with an 
increase in property crime. Such policies also resulted in declines in the real terms value of 
welfare benefits (which did not keep up with inflation), increases in unemployment, 
economic inequality and crime, a toughening of the criminal justice system,lx and increases in 
penal populism.lxi  
Nevertheless, there are deficiencies with this previous work. The first is the obvious question 
of the ecological fallacy; are the national-level findings corroborated by individual- and 
region-level data? In addition to this, national-level modelling is unable to assess the degree 
to which the effects of the economic policies pursued fell unevenly in the UK. The UK’s 
industrial geography is an uneven one, with the industrial base spatially-clustered.lxii Herein 
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been analyzed in such a way as to enable us to explore the geographical effects of economic 
policies. As such, as well as speaking to debates in criminology, our paper makes 
contributions to political geography and wider understandings of macro-level economic 
policies on the lives of citizens.    
     
Research Design 
Recall that our key focus is to explore processes of political change and offending trajectories 
at the individual-level. Whilst no data set would ever be perfect for this, the British Cohort 
Study (hereafter BSC70) makes an extremely good vehicle with which to study the impact of 
dramatic social, economic and policy change on a cohort of people. The cohort was born in 
one week of April 1970 and grew up during the 1980s (during which they would have 
experienced changes in economic, social welfare, housing and schooling policies). The BCS70 
is large enough for us to explore the unfolding of life-courses over several years. In all, 16,135 
babies were born and recruited into the BCS70 (98% of all births in that week). Although the 
births are limited to one week in 1970, there are no reasons why this cohort ought to be 
considered unique or non-representative in any way. As such, the cohort has been 
repeatedly used as if it were a nationally-representative sample. The BCS70 allows us to 
explore the social and economic changes of the 1980s due to the regular timing of the 
follow-up interviews (ages 5, 10, 16, 26 and 30). In 1970 mothers were interviewed, 
providing us with some background data on the social environments in which the cohort 
would spend its formative years. This was also one year before the UK’s 1971 Census was 
undertaken. In 1975 mothers were re-interviewed, and asked questions about their 
children’s behavior. In 1980 the children were interviewed and questions relating to crime 
were first fielded. Again, this preceded the UK’s 1981 Census by one year. In 1986 (when 
aged 16) these survey questions were expanded to include contact with the police and 
convictions in court. These topics were revisited in 1996 when the cohort was 26, and again 
in 2000. Teachers and head-teachers were also interviewed whilst the child was at school (in 
1975, 1980 and 1986). The survey regularly fielded questions on cohort members’ social and 
economic circumstances (type of housing, neighbourhood characteristics, schooling and 
employment experiences, household composition, home leaving, homelessness, relationship 
formation, marriage and child-rearing, peer relations, and medical experiences), as well as 
social attitudes, political affiliation, alcohol consumption, and psychological wellbeing. The 
BCS70 cohort’s geographical location was also recorded at each interview, allowing us to 
undertake county-level analyzes.lxiii 
 
Analytic Strategy and Results 
The analytic strategy we adopt builds on that proposed by Elder and Pellerinlxiv for linking 
structures and human lives. We explore how involvement with key social institutions and the 
organisations associated with them can initiate and maintain (or in some cases alter) the 
trajectories of offending careers. Because much offending occurs in early adolescence but is 
likely for some individuals to be maintained into adulthood, our model measures offending 
twice (at 16) and in adulthood, up to age 30.  We first build a ‘baseline’ structural equation 
modellxv including key individual-level variables (e.g. relationships with key social institutions 
such as families of origin, schools, employers and marital relationships). This model (outlined 
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in Figure 4A) allows us to identify the causal structure of offending and the social, 
institutional and organisational background(s) against which this takes place. This model 
represents a fairly standard model of offending over the life-course, and fits the data well 
(Figure 4B). Next, we rerun the model (outlined in Figure 5A and B), but include a measure of 
economic restructuring. Let us commence by outlining Figure 4A. 
Figure 4A specifies a regression path from being Disciplined at School (as reported by the 




The first of these variables relates to more serious forms of school punishment such as being 
suspended or excluded; being caned; being given another form of corporeal punishment or 
having a report on the child’s behavior sent home to their parents. The questions recorded 
how often the teachers had used those forms of punishment in general (rather than for the 
child in question) and were coded as ‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘occasionally’ and ‘often’. Whilst this 
measure does not provide us with data on the child’s experiences, it does provide us with an 
insight into the school’s approach to discipline in which the child was located whilst at school 
(an important contextual variable associated with school outcomes ). A child who sees 
directly or learns of severe forms of punishment second-hand will be affected by this general 
punishment milieu. Higher scores indicate greater experiences of the more serious forms of 
punishment. School Alienation was measured by seven items which focused on the child’s 
feelings about school (and dealt with the extent to which the child felt that “school is largely 
a waste of time”; that they were “quiet in classroom and get on with work”; that they 
thought “homework is a bore”; that they found “it difficult to keep my mind on work”; that 
they “never take work seriously”; that they did “not like school” and that they believed that 
making plans was “pointless; take things as they come”). The children could say if they found 
these statements “very true”, “partly true” or “not true at all”. These were factor analyzed 
(KMO value of .836 and producing one factor with an Eigen value of 2.924). Higher scores on 
the School Alienation measure indicated higher levels of alienation. From School Alienation 
we specify three further paths; to Employed (at 26), to Offending (10 to 16), and to Offending 
(16 to 30).   These were all asked of the cohort members. The first of these variables is a 
binary of whether or not the cohort member was working (full time or part time, and 
including those studying, temporarily sick and off work, in training or looking after the home) 
or were unemployed (including those on long-term sick). The first offending measure relates 
to the number of times they had been cautioned at a police station between 10 and 16. In 
order to measure the same sort of experiences between 16 and 30, we used data reported at 
age 30 relating to experiences of being arrested and taken to a police station going back to 
16. We specify a path from Employed (at 26) to Offending (16 to 30), and one from Offending 
(10 to 16) to Offending (16 to 30). Whilst the upper half of the path diagram models forms of 
formal social control (school and employment), the lower half models familial processes. We 
specify a path from being on the ‘At Risk’ Register (at 10) (measured by school nurses or 
health visitors and based on school health records), to the child’s report of the Quality of 
Relationship with their Parents (at 16) which is a sum of their answers to questions about 
their parents “treating me like a child”, “not understand[ing] me/my motives” and “being too 
strict, bossy and having too many rules” (children could agree or disagree with each 
statement). This we also regress on to Offending (10 to 16), and a further self-report of the 
Quality of their Relationship with their Partner (at 30) (a single item) and from this, finally to 









The model fitted the data well (NFI = .956, CFI = .969, RMSEA = .011) and explained about 
27% of the observed variance, with seven of the twelve paths statistically significant (see 
Figure 4B for the standardized regression coefficients, which are marked in bold if they are 
statistically significant at at least the <.05 level). Four of the five non-statistically significant 
paths relate to familial processes; all of the key explanatory variables associated with 
offending were associated with school or employment. Being on the ‘At Risk’ Register (at 10) 
was the only familial process variable which was statistically significantly related to offending 
(for offending between 10 and 16). Schools which tended to use more severe forms of 
discipline tended to have more ‘alienated’ children at age 16. School Alienation (at 16) was 
related to Employment (at 26) (such that those who were more alienated from school were 
less likely to be employed at 26), and Offending (10 to 16) and Offending (16 to 30) such that 
the more alienated were more likely to have been arrested by the police. As one might 
imagine, being on the ‘At Risk’ Register (at 10) was also associated with Offending (10 to 16). 
Being employed at 26 was negatively associated with Offending (16 to 30), suggesting that 
employment acted as a suppressant factor in terms of offending. There was a high degree of 
stability in terms of offending between childhood (aged 10-16) and adulthood (16-30). 
Quality of relationships (with parents and partners) was not a key part of the model, but may 
reflect the instability of such measures which may fluctuate, making measurement less 
stable. In short, the baseline model we have fitted replicates earlier models in this tradition, 
with the theoretical expectations being in line with the findings of others.lxx  
The second step of our analytic strategy sees us repeat this model, this time including a 
variable which captures the degree of economic restructuring experienced by the community 
in which each BSC70 cohort member was living when they were aged 16 in 1986 (Figure 5A). 
Our measure of Economic Change (1971-1981) uses data from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses 
and is the sum of: 
a) the proportion of the economically active population employed in mining in 1971, and 
b) the proportion of economically active unemployed males in 1981. 
These proportions were summed for each county and applied to each cohort member based 
on the county they were living in during 1986 at age 16. We chose data for those working in 
coal mining in 1971 as it was a good barometer of industrial activity at that time, since 
mining was co-located with steel production and processing in South Wales, South Yorkshire, 
Central Belt Scotland and Teesside, and ship-building (in and around Glasgow in particular), 
and the maintenance of locomotives and railway distribution in centers in Derby, Doncaster, 
Nottingham, Sheffield, York, and Central Belt Scotland). In 1970 there were approximately 
290,000 people (mainly men) working in 293 mines. By 1986, following the year-long miners’ 
strike, this had dropped to roughly 91,000 working in 110 mines.lxxi By summing this with the 
proportion of unemployed males in 1981, we created a single item measure of areas which 
were heavily industrial at t1 (1971) and which at t2 (1981) were experiencing high levels of 
male unemployment, due in most cases to loss of jobs amongst industrial and related 
employers and which had not recovered after 10 years. Our measure therefore describes the 
economic trajectories of industrial areas over 10 years.  
This variable measures change over time, since there was a significant and rapid loss of 
employment in industries associated with mining and male employees were amongst those 
most affected by this, hence our use of two measures at two points of time. Whilst there 
were other social changes which took place alongside these processes (such as the greater 
inclusion of females in the labor market), for many individual households such processes 
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were in part a response to the loss of traditional forms of (male) employment. Many such 
communities lived and worked closely together such that local state housing estates (‘council 
houses’) were dominated by families who derived their household incomes from the same 
employer (or interdependent employers), meaning that when coal production declined or 
ceased altogether in one community, so the livelihoods of whole estates were impacted 
upon. In order for readers to ‘locate’ the parts of Britain most heavily affected by the 
economic changes of the early-1980s, Figure 6 provides a map of the Britain which shows the 
levels of economic restructuring using this measure plotted by county. The four rectangles 
mark four areas of Britain in which economic restructuring was heavily pronounced (and are 
namely Central Belt Scotland, the North-East shoulder, Central Belt England and the Welsh 
Valleys).lxxii 
The expanded model is identical to the baseline model, with the exception of the inclusion of 
the Economic Change variable described above. This we locate to the left-hand side of the 
model (implying temporal and causal precedence), and from it we specify paths to five of the 
variables in the original model (Disciplined at School, School Alienation, Offending (10 to 16), 
‘At Risk’ Register (at 10) and Quality of their Relationship with the Partner (at 30)). Of these 
five new paths, three were statistically significant; those leading to Disciplined at School, 
School Alienation, and Offending (10 to 16). The model (Figure 5B) fitted the data well (NFI = 
.942, CFI = .958 and the RMSEA was .012), and again explained about 27% of the observed 
variance. Of the statistically significant paths specified, the model indicates that greater 
levels of Economic Change were associated with schools who reported using more severe 
forms of discipline (Disciplined at School (at 10)). This suggests that as economic change took 
place, so schools used more severe discipline measures more frequently. This could be 
because the children themselves were less well-behaved (and hence the teachers responded 
more punitively), or it could be that economic change (independent of its effect on children’s 
behaviors) increased use of severe school discipline measures. Similarly, in the expanded 
model, local Economic Change was associated with higher scores on the School Alienation (at 
16) measure (suggesting that economic change was associated with increases in feelings of 
school alienation), and with Offending (16 to 30), such that people living in areas which 
experienced greater economic change were more likely to offend when aged 10 to 16. The 
measure of the types of discipline meted out at school (Disciplined at School (at 10)) is 
associated with alienated at school (School Alienation (at 16)). Being on the ‘At Risk’ Register 










Our analyzes suggest that economic change lay behind some of the (seemingly) individual-
level processes associated with the commencement of criminal careers, such as weakened 
social bonds with key institutions such as schools and that economic change may (in some 
circumstances) encourage disengagement from schools.lxxiii These relationships suggest that 
greater levels of economic restructuring are associated with greater use of punitive measures 
in schools in those areas which experienced greater levels of restructuring; the same was 
also true for alienation from school (namely that children living in those areas which 
experienced greater levels of restructuring felt more alienated from their schools). Economic 
Change was also directly related to Offending (10 to 16), such that those living in areas of 
greater economic change were likely to have been in trouble more often with the police 
when aged 10 to 16 than those living in areas with lower levels of economic change.  
The third and final stage in our analysis is to rerun the model in Figure 5A, this time 
controlling for the extent of economic change experienced in each area. We have thus far 
shown that Economic Change lay behind some of the individual- and school-level processes 
we have charted. However, what the model reported on in Figure 5B cannot do is to assess 
the extent to which the relationships between these variables were mediated by the extent 
of economic restructuring experienced. We re-ran the model reported in Figure 5B four 
times (Figures 7A-D), with these Figures reporting first those in the lowest quartile of 
Economic Change (Figure 7A), the next lowest (Figure 7B) and so on, up to those who were 
living in the areas with the highest levels of Economic Change (Figure 7D). This strategy 
allows us to explore the strength of the relationships between the variables in the model, 
and allows us to assess the relative impact of Economic Change in those areas with little 
change, as opposed to those areas with greater levels of change. Because we can identify 
which counties are included in each quartile of Economic Change, we are also able to 
comment on the geography of economic restructuring and the extent to which this 
strengthened the relationship between variables which account for offending in some areas 
more than in other areas.       
The first thing to note is that for those who experienced the lowest levels of economic 
change (Figure 7A), the Economic Change variable is not related to other variables.lxxiv This 
suggests that in those areas with low levels of economic change, it was individual-level 
factors which explained offending (towards the right hand side of the diagram). The next 
thing to note is that the degree of Economic Change is only statistically significantly related to 
many of the other variables in the model for the two middle groups (Figures 7B and C). 
However, the degree of Economic Change is related to being on the ‘At Risk’ Register for 
those children in the first of the two groups of counties which experienced the highest levels 
of economic restructuring (Figure 7C). It is also statistically significantly related to Offending 
(10 to 16) for those who experienced a low level of economic change (Figure 7B) and those 
who experienced the highest levels (Figure 7D). However, in Figure 7B it is a negative 
relationship, but for the highest group it is positive. This suggests that in places which 
experienced relatively low levels of economic change, children may have been encouraged 
into engaging with school (supporting earlier Scottish data on this matterlxxv). Hence the 












In areas with relatively low levels of economic change (Figure 7B), Economic Change is 
directly related to Disciplined at School, School Alienation, and Offending (10 to 16). 
However, the paths to the latter two of these are negative (suggesting that economic change 
reduced school alienation and offending. The model for the areas which experienced 
relatively high levels of Economic Change (Figure 7C) suggests that economic change affects 
offending between ages 10 and 16 indirectly via school alienation and being on the at risk 
register. So where economic change was higher it may have demoralized young people and 
placed them at greater risk of harm. In those areas which experienced the greatest levels of 
Economic Change (Figure 7D), economic change was directly related to offending at age 10-
16, suggesting that children in those areas most heavily affected in by economic change were 
drawn directly into offending. Here the relationships with schooling and being ‘at risk’ were 
not found. All of this suggests that the impact of economic restructuring is mediated by the 
degree of economic restructuring; the relationship is not simply linear. 
 
Discussion 
Focusing on the UK’s economic troubles during the 1970s (to which Margaret Thatcher’s 
election can be read as a response) and the early years of the Thatcher governments 
themselves (1979-1981), we have explored the extent to which macro-level economic 
changes can be used to understand the causal antecedents of offending over the life-course. 
To our knowledge, few have ever attempted to empirically locate offending careers within 
wider macro-level structures, or linked these to macro-economic policy and political 
decision-making. Our modelling found that whilst the addition of a variable which captured 
change over a 10-year period did not improve the percentage of variance explained when 
compared to a model which did not include such a variable (Figures 4A to 5B), the fact that 
three of the five additional paths incorporated were statistically significant suggests that 
incorporating such a measure has theoretical merit.lxxvi Further modelling (Figures 7A-7D) 
explored this in greater depth, assessing the extent to which the relationships between the 
variables were modified by the degree of economic restructuring experienced. This 
suggested that whilst the model fitted the data well, the role of economic restructuring was 
especially key in areas with greater levels of economic restructuring.  Substantively this 
would suggest that the social and economic changes initiated (either via deliberate policy 
developments or as unintended consequences) during and since the early-1980s have altered 
citizens’ engagement in crime, and that this is especially the case for those in counties which 
experienced the greatest levels of economic restructuring. 
Our theoretical position has been that the relationship between increases in unemployment 
in the early-1980s, especially in communities which relied on coal mining and heavy industry 
for their incomes, were worst affected when monetarist policies were adopted in the UK in 
the early-1980s. As such, our paper is concerned with the effects of changes in the political 
governance of the economy in the early-1980s, the impacts that this had on engagement in 
crime for young people living in the UK at that time, and their subsequent offending in 
adulthood. The dramatic increases in crime witnessed in the UK during the 1980s led to the 
development of a more punitive criminal justice system in the 1990s.lxxvii Such dramatic 
changes in unemployment (which stood at just over 4% in 1979, but had increased to almost 












and forced many families who were dependent on (typically) male breadwinners for their 
livelihoods into, or close to, poverty. That these job losses were clustered, made the impact of 
such levels of unemployment on crime all the greater, since it encouraged the development of 
offending networks.lxxviii
lxxix
lxxxi, was associated with juvenile offending (10
lxxxii
lxxxiii
 Hence the radicalism of the early phase of Thatcherite economic 
policies created quite profound and immediate economic problems (not simply unemployment, 
but long-term, and geographically-concentrated levels of unemployment) which fell 
disproportionately on those communities which had relied on manufacturing and mining for 
their livelihoods. Over time, and augmented by retrenchment in other social policies,  the 
neighbourhoods in which those who had relied on heavy industry for their incomes became 
associated with crime and disorder. On the whole, economic change was associated with 
increases in levels school alienation, which, following what we know from other studieslxxx, as 
well as our own modelling -16) as well as 
offending into adulthood. School failure, unemployment and engagement in crime started to 
take on inter- and intra-relationships familiar to criminal careers researchers. As such, 
interlocking social and economic policies relating to housing, schooling and economic 
management started a set of processes which altered the social and economic geography of the 
UK, such that the greater levels of impoverishment started to coalesce together in both regions 
of the UK and smaller geographies. Part of this story of change, then, relates to the uneven 
geographical impact of political decision-making. When the Labour Party returned to power in 
1997, their manifesto promised to tackle just such uneven deprivation (as part of their New 
Deal for Communities program).   Much of this, of course, resonates with what we already 
know about the causal antecedents of offending; those with lower levels of engagement with 
schools, and who are at risk are likely to start offending early in life. Similarly, early engagement 
in crime is likely to foster continued engagement in offending. Employment (especially after the 
age of 25 ), is negatively associated with offending. What is novel, however, is our focus on 
the wider economic restructuring which may have entrenched such causal processes in the first 
place, and the political ideology which shaped this. 
Like Benson’s review of the political processes which may shape criminal careers, we found that 
the key processes which appeared to have operated as causal antecedents took many years to 
lead to entrenched offending. The budget of 1981 (when the BCS70 children were 11) increased 
levels of unemployment, which affected the lives of some of the cohorts’ families. Their peak 
age of conviction would not have been for around another nine to 10 years (1990-1991), and 
those who remained engaged in crime would have done so well into their late-20s (the late-
1990s), as suggested by our modelling. The point at which many of the BSC70 would have 
become increasingly engaged in crime (around 15 or 16) coincided with a dramatic increase in 
crime in England & Wales. The data we have at our disposal does not allow us to explore the 
micro-level processes which Haganlxxxiv
lxxxv
 suggests took place in the USA, however other studies 
of the relationships between neighbourhoods and crime  suggests that such processes may 
have been operating in the UK in some places too. More generally our modelling suggests that 
other studies, wherever possible, ought to incorporate variables into their modelling which 
capture the role of political processes and the social and economic changes which may stem 
from these. The substantive message our paper delivers is that the background structural 
causes of offending at the individual-level may rest as much with a country’s politicians as they 
 
 
do ‘street-level’ actors, but that in periods when crime rises dramatically as a result of this, it 
may be subsequent governments who have it deal with the ‘fall out’. Politics shapes the 
economic policies adopted, which in turn affects the communities which people live in via the 
availability of work, and influences the extent to which young people may regard their own 
futures as worthy of investment (leading to alienation from school) and the extent to which 
offending (either out of frustration or economic need) may be an appropriate response. Given 
what we know about offending careers, and the difficulty of ceasing these once they have 





























This table lists the minimum and maximum values of each of the variables used in the models, 
along with the mean for each of these and its standard deviation. All the data is available from 
the UK Data Service (https://ukdataservice.ac.uk/). The Study Numbers are listed for each 
individual sweep of the data. These data were extracted by ourselves and brought into one file 
to enable the above analyzes.  




Disciplined at School 1.00 16.00 11.36 3.26 SN 3723 
On ‘At Risk’ Register 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 SN 3723 
School Alienation -1.42 2.75 0.00 0.88 SN 3535 
Quality of Parental Relationship 3.00 6.00 3.34 0.67 SN 3535 
Offending at 16 0.00 6.00 0.71 0.43 SN 3535 
Employed at 26 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 SN 3833 
Quality of Partner Relationship 1.00 7.00 5.14 2.26 SN 5558 
Offending at 30 0.00 9.00 0.39 1.26 SN 5558 
Economic Change 0.01 0.19 0.06 0.02 SN 5558 
 
Disciplined at School was coded so that children who were attending schools which used 
serious punishments more regularly scored more highly. Being On the ‘At Risk’ Register was a 
binary, with 0 as not on the ‘At Risk’ Register, and 1 representing those children who were on 
the register. School Alienation was the result of a factor analysis, coded such that higher scores 
indicated a higher degree of alienation. The Quality of Parental Relationship was the sum of 
three items, coded so that higher scores meant a better quality of child-parent relationship (as 
reported by the child). Offending at 16 and Offending at 30 were both coded so that 0 indicated 
that the respondent had not been cautioned by the police, and a whole number indicated the 
number of times they had been cautioned. Employed at 26 was a binary, with 1 indicating 
employment (full or part-time, studying, in training, temporarily ill and off work and those who 
were looking after the home. 0 indicated those unemployed or those on long-term sick. Quality 
of Partner Relationship was coded so that lower scores indicated a happier relationship.  
Economic Change was calculated from two variables from the UK census recorded for the 
county at which the respondent was living in 1986 (see the main text), and is a percentage, 
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